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The objective of this paper is the definition of a 
new methodology for carrying out security risk 
assessment in the Air Traffic Management 
(ATM) domain. This process is carried out by 
modelling the system, identifying the assets, 
threats and vulnerabilities, prioritizing the 
threats and proposing countermeasures for the 
weaknesses found.  
ATM security is concerned with securing the 
ATM assets, to prevent threats and limit their 
effects on the overall aviation network. This 
effect limitation could be achieved by removing 
the vulnerability from the system and/or 
increasing the tolerance in case of component 
failures due to attacks.  
The security risk assessment methodology 
proposed is based on what is currently being 
done by the industry and international 
organisations (International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO), Common Criteria (CC), 
International Standard Organisation (ISO), 
EUROCONTROL Guidance Material, etc.) and 
comprises five main stages.  
For demonstrative purposes, the methodology is 
applied to a case study on the Flight Data 
Processing Subsystem (FDPS), which is a 
component of many ATM systems. 
1 Introduction  
ATM security is concerned with securing the 
ATM assets (including services), to prevent 
threats and limit their effects on the overall 
aviation network. This effect limitation could be 
achieved by removing the vulnerability from the 
system and/or increasing the tolerance in case of 
component failures due to attacks. 
Recent ATM vulnerabilities discovered and 
attacks executed (e.g. refer to [1]), prove that 
the security of these systems is always under the 
spotlight, which is also confirmed by public 
entities (e.g. refer to [2]). Furthermore, the 
increasing complexity of ATM system(s) due to 
the pervasiveness of emerging technologies and 
growing number of daily flights create the 
conditions for the rise of unpredicted threats that 
may potentially turn into dramatic events. This 
is also driven by the on-going update of legacy 
systems with new technologies and their 
connection to innovative systems, which creates 
a new environment with new threat vectors, for 
which these systems were not prepared when 
they were designed. Thereby, given that the 
ATM plays a critical role in supporting the 
overall airspace/aviation system, the security 
risk assessment of ATM should be a major 
concern and a top priority.  
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Presently, the ICAO Security Manual for 
Safeguarding Civil Application, one of the main 
references for threat and risk assessment in the 
ATM domain, offers little help in identifying 
and prioritising threats according to time and 
budget constraints. On the other side, new 
guidelines are on the way, such as those 
currently being developed in the Sub Work 
Package (SWP) 16.2 of the Single European 
Sky ATM Research (SESAR) project, which 
focus on ATM security framework, 
methodology, tools and best practices. 
As a consequence, the security risk 
assessment methodology proposed in this paper 
can be seen as generic, as it is not bound to any 
technological or implementation constraints, so 
it can be applied to most ATM systems. In fact 
it is based on an abstract model defining assets, 
threats and vulnerabilities related to any ATM 
system. In fact, it addresses the following 
objectives:  
- To be adopted either by state-of-the-art 
ATM systems as well as legacy systems 
allowing the assessment of the new risks 
that their interconnection may (and will) 
introduce. 
- To be based on existing and well 
established safety standards already in 
use by the industry, including the ICAO, 
the CC, the ISO 270xx, etc. and extend 
them to cover the ATM security scenario. 
For example, although widely adopted, 
the CC does not provide the procedures 
that should be used to assess the security 
of the system, whereas the risk 
assessment methodology that we present 
addresses this aspect. 
- To be complementary with the risk 
assessment methodology currently being 
developed within SESAR and other EU 
projects in ATM security.  
2 Security Assessment Methodology 
The proposed methodology is based on what 
is currently being done by the industry and it 
comprises five main stages that should be 
revisited during the development and 
periodically, after the deployment of the ATM 
system. The methodology is the synthesis of 
SESAR/ICAO ATM security guidelines and of 
Microsoft Threat Modelling for the software 
related threats: 
1. Assets identification. The ATM system 
is formally decomposed using Use Cases 
or Data Flow Diagrams (DFD) to obtain 
the list of assets and their 
interconnections. The technique used is 
complemented with information about 
trust (or privilege) boundaries between 
entities. 
2. Threat analysis. This stage involves 
determining the possible threats to each 
asset identified in the previous stage. The 
following groups of security attributes are 
used to obtain and classify the threats: the 
widely accepted set consisting of 
Confidentiality, Integrity and 
Availability, or a more detailed view 
consisting of Authentication, Integrity, 
Non-repudiation, Confidentiality, 
Availability and Authorization. It is also 
in this stage where the Fault Tree model 
of the threats of each asset is built.  
3. Vulnerability assessment. Closely 
related to the threats, vulnerabilities also 
drive the respective countermeasures, 
which will be implemented in the last 
stage, according to the risk analysis 
outcome. 
4. Risk analysis. This allows prioritizing 
the threat mitigation by directing the 
resources to the most critical threats first. 
Risk is a measure of the threat impacts to 
the system vs. the probability of that 
threat to occur. Several schemes to obtain 
the likelihood of the occurrence of the 
threat may be used, some of them based 
on the outputs that can already be 
obtained from the SESAR project. 
5. Countermeasure identification/risk 
treatment. This provides the mitigation 
procedures that need to be executed in 
order to eliminate the threat or limit its 
effect to an acceptable residual level. 
They are closely related to the specific 
threat they apply to and to the target 
vulnerabilities. The set of 
countermeasures/security controls are the 
most important output from this security 
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assessment methodology as they can be 
seen as the recommendations or the 
security requirements for the ATM under 
assessment. 
2.1 Assets identification 
An asset is something of value to the 
Organisation. In general, technological assets 
combine logical and physical assets and can be 
grouped into the following categories: 
- Information. Documented (paper or 
electronic) data or intellectual property 
used to meet the mission of an 
Organisation. 
- Software. Software applications and 
services (such as operating systems, 
database applications, networking 
software, office applications, custom 
applications, etc.) that process, store, or 
transmit information. 
- Hardware. Physical devices needed for 
the proper functioning of the 
Organisation (such as workstations, 
servers, etc.). This asset normally focus 
solely on the replacement costs for 
physical devices. 
- People. The people in an Organisation 
that possess unique skills, knowledge, 
and experience and that are difficult to 
replace. 
2.2 Threat analysis 
An ATM system consists of a set of 
hardware, software and communication assets, 
operated by several users with different 
operation statuses. Threat assessment and risk 
management together form the basis of a viable 
and cost effective security response to threats 
that could target ATM system. One of the most 
difficult tasks for security professionals is 
devising an effective security plan that 
correlates to the threat. Accurately identifying 
the threat or threats must be the first step in the 
process. Our challenge is to perform a 
quantitative analytical approach will be used to 
perform threat assessment.  
In devising a threat assessment methodology, 
it is preferable to use a systematic and 
quantifiable approach. Therefore, the threat 
assessment proposed to evaluate the threats 
affecting the ATM system uses a quantitative 
analytical approach. The structure of this 
methodology employs three core principles of 
security: identify, implement and sustain.  
In undertaking the task of assessing the 
threats, there are several sources of empirical 
evidence and statistical data available in the 
fields of intelligence and security from which to 
form an analysis of past trends of acts of 
unlawful interference. In order to provide 
decision-makers with a current and credible 
threat assessment, however, multiple sources of 
information should be explored. Threat and 
vulnerability criteria have to be determined 
before conducting the assessment by deciding 
on focal points/hot spots. Focal points can be 
defined as those factors or criteria that are 
estimated to have the most weight or value in a 
given process.  
This methodology utilises two facets of 
analysis that together form a credible means of 
assessing the threat and determining a security 
response through application of risk 
management measures. 
First, it must be understood that a deliberate 
act of unlawful interference must, by definition, 
be premeditated and carried out with purpose by 
the perpetrators. This means that someone has a 
reason to conduct an unlawful act and thus 
proceeds to plan and execute the act. Therefore, 
before assessing how an act of unlawful 
interference may be carried out against a target, 
the analyst should first consider the reasons why 
an unlawful act would be committed and the 
probability of its being committed. 
The next step would be to create a working 
tool to assist in the assessment process: the 
Vulnerability Matrix. The Vulnerability Matrix 
forms the final analysis for a follow-on risk 
management process. It covers security threat 
categories, which can be adapted to assess the 
threat directed at a potential target or to evaluate 
the security posture of a part of the system. 
Security professionals have long recognized 
that implementing increased preventive 
measures commensurate with a higher level of 
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threat has an associated expense that may 
become a heavy financial burden on the 
resources of an Organisation. It is therefore 
considered more effective to deploy defences 
where and when they are most needed rather 
than applying them universally. This concept is 
called risk management. 
Standards consist of a minimum set of 
security control measures that are expected to be 
applied equally at international level regardless 
of the threat environment impacting on 
operations. While these arrangements were 
established to ensure minimum uniform 
standards, no specific standards exist to address 
variable threat conditions. Whenever an 
Organisation introduces additional security 
measures to meet a higher threat level, it may 
find that implementation is difficult to sustain, 
especially when the extra measures have not 
been tailored to the specific threat. Therefore, 
once an Organisation has properly assessed the 
nature and level of threat within its own 
territory, it can then apply appropriate enhanced 
measures. Organisations can profit of a risk 
management approach whereby enhanced 
measures are implemented either to prevent an 
unlawful act from being committed or, at a 
minimum, to mitigate any consequences 
resulting from an unlawful act.  
2.3 Vulnerability assessment 
A vulnerability assessment is a systematic, 
point-in-time examination of an Organisation’s 
technology base, policies, and procedures. It 
includes a complete analysis of the security of 
an internal environment and its vulnerability to 
internal and external attacks.  
Technology-driven assessments generally: 
- Use standards for specific IT security 
activities (such as hardening specific 
types of platforms). 
- Assess the entire computing 
infrastructure. 
- Use (sometimes proprietary) software 
tools to analyze the infrastructure and all 
of its components. 
- Provide a detailed analysis showing the 
detected technological vulnerabilities and 
possibly recommending specific steps to 
address those vulnerabilities. 
2.4 Risk analysis 
According to the ISO GUIDE 73:2002, “Risk 
is the combination of the probability of an event 
and its consequences”. Inversely, an enterprise 
manager should decide to make a financial 
effort to harden a specific asset if the cost of 
securing it is less than the risk of loss of the 
asset. In other words, the manager must be sure 
that the cost of security in every transaction 
involving the asset is less than the risk of loss. 
This is the foundation of security risk 
management, as detailed by Dan Geer [5]. 
In fact security can be seen as risk 
management, because we do not want to spend 
too much on security, comparing to what assets 
we are protecting. Many times, the big questions 
posed in an enterprise when it needs to calculate 
the budget is the measure of the potential loss 
and lack of knowledge of where it is likely to 
occur. 
A Threat is, in a general approach, anything 
that might trigger a Risk. However, it is 
important to point out that a Threat is not 
directly connected to Risks. A Threat is 
effective only if it is connected to a 
Vulnerability. The Risk is thus dependant on the 
Vulnerability rather than on the Threat itself. If 
there is a Vulnerability but there is no Threat 
using it, the Risk remains. Hence, Threats are 
mitigated through Vulnerability Analysis over 
the Assets. According to the Vulnerability 
Analysis, the Threats can be eliminated or 
reduced to a point where the value of the Risk is 
acceptable. The process of mitigating the 
Vulnerabilities is on the scope of the Security 
Policies and it is implemented with the 
Countermeasures. The Security Framework will 
define the Security Policy and the Risk 
Management Process to secure ATM system.  
At the system level, the risk deliberated can 
be defined by the following formula: 
Risk = Likelihood of the Threat * 
Vulnerability * Consequences of the 
Exploitation 
(1) 
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The assessment of likelihood takes into 
account statistical analyses. The assessments of 
the consequences in terms of loss of security 
will be considered as the consequence on the 
operational reliability in the sense that each 
threat scenario will be evaluated regarding the 
consequence of the loss of a corresponding 
security criteria and cost of the primary asset on 
the operational reliability. 
2.5 Countermeasure identification/risk 
treatment 
The main purpose of any security 
countermeasure is prevention. Therefore, after 
the first step to identify the threat or threats is 
completed, the next task is to devise an 
appropriate security response commensurate 
with that threat. This task employs the 
implement principle. 
If the assumption is made that potential 
perpetrators with the intention to interfere can 
defeat a security system if given enough 
information, time and opportunity, then the 
logical objective is how best to deter the 
perpetrators from carrying out a successful act 
of unlawful interference. It is therefore essential 
that the implementation of suitable preventive 
security measures be considered. 
This operational intervention leads to the 
third principle, sustain, which can be described 
as an Organisation having the political will and 
accompanying capability to maintain 
appropriate reliable security practices. Without 
the commitment to sustain effective security 
measures, the efficacy of the other principles is 
diminished. 
Countermeasures/security controls will be 
identified for risk management. A 
countermeasure is any system, passive or active, 
aimed at resolving a risk occurrence. By nature 
it is reactive rather than proactive, and is aimed 
at mitigating the loss due to the risk occurrence. 
Depending on the nature of the risk and the kind 
of countermeasure, the risk outcome can be only 
partially mitigated or totally mitigated.  
The security countermeasures identified will 
be spread over the ATM system architecture  
[4]. 
3 Case Study: FDPS 
For demonstrative purposes, we will apply 
our methodology to a case study on FDPS, 
which is a component of many ATM systems. 
FDPS is based on a open architecture that 
manages the flight plan data accepting, 
processing, updating and distributing the 
trajectories and related data, according to the 
aircraft current position. It supports the air 
traffic controllers during the planning and 
progress phases of the flight. The safety solution 
implemented by FDPS is based on redundancy, 
duplicating FDPS instances and managing this 
distributed system. However, this increases the 
attack surface of FDPS and creates new entry 
points that may not be so well protected, like 
those related with the management and 
synchronization between FDPS instances. By 
increasing the safety of FDPS the current design 
may also be affecting its security and this is 
where our security assessment methodology can 
be applied, contributing to uncover and mitigate 
these issues. 
FDPS provides the processing of flight plan 
data and other related information to support air 
traffic controllers during the planning and 
progress phases of flights. 
FDPS is based on an open architecture which 
provides the processing of flight plan data and 
other related information to support air traffic 
controllers during the planning and progress 
phases of flights [3]. 
FDPS is capable of accepting, processing, 
updating, distributing and displaying flight data 
and other information, according with ICAO 
requirements and in compliance with European 
Air Traffic Management Programme (EATMP) 
requirements.  
3.1 Assets identification 
FDPS is formally decomposed using Data 
Flow Diagrams to obtain the list of assets and 
their interconnections.  
Flight plans data can be received via the 
Aeronautical Fixed Telecommunication 
Network (AFTN) lines, by means of Air Traffic 
Services (ATS) messages from eligible sources 
(e.g. the Integrated Initial Flight Plan Processing 
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System (IFPS)), via the connections with 
adjacent ATS units, or by means of notification 
and coordination messages according to 
EUROCONTROL Standard for On-Line Data 
Interchange (OLDI).  
Furthermore, authorised operators can enter 
the flight plans. 
Whenever an updating of one or more 
System Flight Plan (SFPL) Data is performed, 
FDPS provides the updated data to Control 
Working Position (CWP) operators by means of 
SFPL and other external users, such as ATS 
units and Airport Report Office (ARO), by 
OLDI and ATS messages.  
FDPS receives the Monitoring Aids data 
from the Safety Nets, and it receives Air Traffic 
Flow Management (ATFM) and ATS messages 
from Central Flow Management Unit (CFMU), 
whilst Meteo messages are received from the 
Meteo/Aeronautical Information Service (AIS) 
units.  
Warning and SFPL data are provided to the 
Flight Data Assistant. 
Furthermore, FDPS sends the diagnostic 
towards the Control Management System 
(CMS), and Special Service Request (SSR) 
Codes data, Configuration and Sectorisation 
data are sent to FDP Technical Supervisor. 
The FDP system is provided in a redundant 
highly reliable configuration consisting of two 
identical instances and of distributed logics. It is 
provided in a redundant configuration to ensure 
the radar data processing continuity in the 
system.  
FDPS function is required to receive data 
from and/or send data to a number of other 
functions and systems. The following table 
reports FDPS interfaces: 
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Table 1 Data Flow in/out for FDPS 
3.2 Threat analysis 
FDPS Hardware security threats will be 
investigated. First of all, hardware assets will be 
categorised, then the following main sources of 
threats will be analysed: 
- “Physical attack” 
An attack aimed at interrupting, disturbing or 
in any case damaging the infrastructure. The 
basic key point is that the attack is done in the 
physical domain rather than in the information 
domain.  
- “Environmental threats”  
It can be classified as a special case of 
Physical attacks, whereas the point is that the 
threat can also arise from natural causes. 
Typically, this is the case for climatic 
phenomenon seismic phenomenon, 
meteorological phenomenon or flood, which can 
directly lead to physical damages like fire, 
water, pollution, major accident, destruction of 
equipment of media, dust, corrosion, freezing. 
As a secondary consequence, events like loss of 
power, failure of telecommunication equipment, 
electromagnetic or thermal radiation may occur 
that can bring down electronic and computing 
systems. 
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ATM Software security threats will be 
investigated. First of all, software functionalities 
will be categorised, then the following main 
sources of threats will be analysed: 
- “Intrusion” 
Any form of attack that leads the attacker to 
gain unauthorized access to one of the ATM 
subsystems. The attack can be performed in a 
number of ways, mainly dependant on software 
and protocols bugs and vulnerabilities. 
ATM Information security threats will be 
investigated. First of all, communication assets 
and functionalities will be categorised, then the 
following main sources of threats will be 
analysed: 
- “Data corruption and stealing” 
It can arise from two different events: 
a) Communication security failure 
b) System security failure 
The first is a consequence of an attack aimed 
at the communication infrastructure, hence on 
the data being transmitted. The second kind 
arises from an attack to a working server or 
client, i.e., an intrusion.  
- “Identity usurpation” 
It is usually the consequence of a successful 
attack either at communication or system level, 
i.e., data stealing or system intrusion. The 
usurper can use the stolen identity to perform 
actions of systems that, at first, might seems 
perfectly legit. 
3.3 Vulnerability assessment 
The following Computer Software 
Configuration Items (CSCIs) are included 
within the software architecture of FDPS: 
CSCI Description 
FTF Fault Tolerance Function: provides services that 
can be used to handle automatic fail over of 
applications and data files associated even in the 
event of operating system, services or hardware 
failures; when the active node fails, its resources 
are transferred to the standby node. 
XSD Advanced System Message Dispatcher: provides 
dispatching of commands and diagnostic 
messages. XSD produces Node Status Messages 
using information collected from those CSCIs 
running inside the same node: 
 SPV sends information about system 
CSCI Description 
peripherals and devices status; 
 other CSCIs send their internal logical 
status. 
XSD collects these data and then sends the node 
status message periodically to the other system 
nodes. 
SPV Supervisor: supports for node and process start-
up/shutdown, provides the information about the 
peripherals status and the Node Role 
(Master/Stand-by) and manages the operator 
system console in order to view diagnostic 
messages and to issue commands. 
CDB Common Data Base: handles the whole system 
configuration, manages the dynamic role of the 
CWPs and constantly aligns a so called Common 
Data Base (CDB). CDB is also a Data Base Fault 
Tolerant and this capability is achieved by its 
replication on the all system nodes. Consistency 
of the databases is achieved through a Best 
Node. 
AFS Advanced FDP Server: responsible for the 
processing of the core functions of FDPS, 
including the environment data handling, the 
flight data processing and distribution, the 
message handling and data exchange with the 
other subsystems. 
AFJ Advanced Flight Data Processing Java M.M.I.: 
provides eligible operators with an HMI 
supporting the following functionality: 
 Environment data management, where these 
information are separated in dynamic data, 
geographical data and configuration of 
OLDI and ATS units. 
 SFPL data management. 
 Message handling including: generation of 
one message(OLDI and ATS format), 
management of wrong and rejected message. 
 RPL management. 
 System administration (e.g. line 
configuration) 
 Archived data/messages inspection 
 SSR Code configuration 
IOL Input/Output LAN: provides a set of basic point-
to-point and multipoint communication services 
allowing the exchange of messages among 
CSCIs of different nodes.  
IKS Internal Kernel SPV: provides communication 
services allowing the exchange of messages from 
CSCIs toward LAN. The high level protocol 
used to communicate over the LAN connecting 
the computers is the User Datagram Protocol 
(UDP). 
Table 2 FDPS’ CSCIs 
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Only the following CSCIs represent a 
vulnerability for FDPS: AFS, CDB and IKS, 
considering the criticality and the impact on the 
system if affected by malicious attacks. 
3.4 Risk analysis 
There is no statistic data available related to 
FDPS attacks to justify a likelihood analysis. 
For this reason, risk will be evaluated 
considering just the impact of potential threats 
on the system and assuming the probability 
equal to 1 (i.e. 100%). Countermeasures are so 
identified, initially, on the basis of the threat 
analysis and the architecture of the system. 
The following table reports FDPS risk 
analysis: 
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CSCI Threat Local Effect System Effect Severity 
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CSCI Threat Local Effect System Effect Severity 
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Table 3 FDPS risk analysis 
3.5 Countermeasures identification/risk 
treatment 
The set of countermeasures are the most 
important output from this security assessment 
methodology as they can be seen as the 
recommendations or the security requirements 
for FDPS. 
According to the risk analysis, the following 
countermeasures can be identified in order to 
limit the effects of attacks that cause corruption 
of data: 
- Syntactic and semantic check algorithms 
of AFS and CDB CSCIs. 
- Syntactic and semantic check algorithms 
of CWP. 
Regarding the loss of data, no 
countermeasure can be identified internal to 
FDPS. Other measures can be identified to 
protect ATM system from intrusions, as 
encryption and decryption algorithms 
passwords. 
4 Conclusion 
The objective of this paper is the definition 
of a new methodology for carrying out security 
risk assessment in the ATM domain. This 
process is carried out by modelling the system, 
identifying the assets, threats and 
vulnerabilities, prioritizing the threats and 
proposing countermeasures for the weaknesses 
found. 
For demonstrative purposes, we have applied 
our methodology to a case study on FDPS, 
which is a component of many ATM systems. 
The results are: 
- the identification of assets, as services 
given by the system,  
- the analysis of threats, as potential 
attacks,  
- the assessment of vulnerabilities, as CSCI 
of the system are vulnerable because 
remotely accessible,  
- the analysis of risks, considering the 
effects of successful attacks,  
- and, finally, the identification of 
countermeasures to limit those effects. 
The proposed methodology allows the 
identification of countermeasures in a 
systematic way. Countermeasures can be 
adopted as security system requirements at 
design level. Nevertheless, not all the 
countermeasures to protect data can be applied, 
and identified, at subsystem level, so the 
security assessment has to be performed also at 
a higher (system) level. 
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